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THE HISTORY, MEANS, AND EFFECTS OF STRUCTURAL SURVEILLANCE 
Jeffrey L. Vagle* 
ABSTRACT 
The focus on the technology of surveillance, while important, has 
had the unfortunate side effect of obscuring the study of 
surveillance generally, and tends to minimize the exploration of 
other, less technical means of surveillance that are both ubiquitous 
and self-reinforcing—what I refer to as structural surveillance—
and their effects on marginalized and disenfranchised populations. 
This Article proposes a theoretical framework for the study of 
structural surveillance which will act as a foundation for follow-on 
research in its effects on political participation. 
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I do really take it for an indisputable truth, and a truth that is one of the corner stones of 
political science—the more strictly we are watched, the better we behave. 
Jeremy Bentham1 
Activities which seem benevolent or helpful to wage earners, persons on relief, or those who 
are disadvantaged in the struggle for existence may be regarded as ‘subversive’ by those 
whose property interests might be burdened thereby. . . Some of our soundest constitutional 
doctrines were once punished as subversive. 
Justice Robert Jackson2 
I. Introduction and Framework 
 
There is nothing particularly new about surveillance. It is a concept that 
is as old as humanity itself. As our earliest societies discovered, without the 
ability to make disobedience of social norms difficult or costly through some 
means of social control, communities of any size would be impossible to 
maintain.3 But how do we discern between surveillance necessary for healthy, 
inclusive, and successful communities, and those means that exercise social 
control to an extent that ultimately endangers community viability? There does 
not appear to be a bright line that clearly separates these regimes.  
To blandly refer to surveillance as the pursuit of societal stability through 
the encouragement of adherence to social norms, however, does not give full 
voice to history’s violent efforts to impose or resist these means of social 
                                            
1 The manuscripts of Jeremy Bentham in the Library of the University College 
London, Box cliib, 331. 
2 Robert Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Journal of the American Judicature 
Society (June 1940) 18. 
3 See note 66, infra, and accompanying text.  
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control.4 Political, economic, religious, and other social institutions all rise and 
fall through the assertion of social control within a localized universe of 
competing and cooperating social units, and through these periods of instability 
and struggle, social institutions emerge.5 These social units then sustain 
themselves by minimizing instability through means selected for their 
ordinariness and relative invisibility.6 Social units beyond the scale of smaller 
groups, such as families or isolated autonomous communities, require powerful 
central administrations and armies of personnel to raise revenue, ensure public 
safety, provide for national security, and the multitude of other functions critical 
to the life of the modern state.7 In the shift to modernity and the information 
                                            
4 See James Beniger, The Control Revolution 1986; Anthony Giddens, The 
Nation-State and Violence 1985; D. Lyon, Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, 
Risk, and Digital Discrimination (2003); Cathy Lisa Schneider, Shantytown 
Protest in Pinochet’s Chile (1995); Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain 
Democracies (1986); Henner Hess, Like Zealots and Romans: Terrorism and 
Empire in the 21st Century, 39 Crime, Law & Social Change 339, 340-41 (2003); 
Lucas de Blois, The Third Century Crisis and the Greek Elite in the Roman 
Empire, Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 33, H. 3, 358 (1984). 
5 See Max Weber, Economy and Society 31 1978; James B. Rule, Social Control 
and Modern Social Structure, in Private Lives and Public Surveillance 19 (1973). 
6 “Faced with the problem of securing compliance from a mobile, anonymous 
public, any regime must do its best to develop techniques to replicate the 
functions of gossip and face-to-face acquaintance in small-scale social settings.” 
Rule, Social Control and Modern Social Structure 23. 
7 “The administrative system of the capitalist state, and of modern states in 
general, has to be interpreted in terms of the coordinated control over delimited 
territorial arenas which it achieves….no pre-modern states were able even to 
approach the level of administrative coordination developed in the nation-state.” 
Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity 57 (1990). See also Weber, 
Economy and Society 48. 
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society, these institutions developed new regimes of surveillance and 
information management using the technological advances that emerged in 
rapid succession starting in the late 19th century.8 
Too often, however, we rely solely on the use of these of advances in 
technology to identify “good” surveillance from “bad” surveillance. An explosion 
of innovation has led us to frame the surveillance debate in terms of intrusions 
specific to a particular use of technology, from the early 20th century (“Can they 
really listen in on my telephone conversations?”) to the late 20th century (“Can 
they really read my email?”) and beyond (“Can they really build a permanent 
database of my location data?”).9 But as new technologies inevitably become 
established as integral parts of our daily lives, our comfort with—or grudging 
acceptance of—advanced surveillance methods tends to stabilize, and the bulk of 
the surveillance debate turns to the realm of the newly possible.  
                                                                                                                                  
This expansion was not without its early critics. Weber himself described the 
“order…now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine 
production which today determine the lives of all the individuals who are born 
into this mechanism” as an “irresistible force” and an “iron cage.” Max Weber, 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 123 (1992). 
8 As Beriger points out, “even the word revolution seems barely adequate to 
describe the development, within the span of a single lifetime, of virtually all of 
the basic communications technologies still in use a century later: photography 
and telegraphy (1830s), rotary power printing (1840s), the typewriter (1860s), 
trans-atlantic cable (1866), telephone (1876), motion pictures (1894), wireless 
telegraphy (1895), magnetic tape recording (1899), radio (1906), and television 
(1923).” Beriger, The Control Revolution at 7. 
9 See Inga Kroener and Daniel Nyland, New Technologies, Security and 
Surveillance, in Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies 141 (Ball, 
Haggarty, and Lyon, eds.) (2012. 
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The exploration and analysis of potential surveillance abuses of new 
technologies is, of course, an important discussion that needs to take place. But 
when we put too much focus on the future, we tend to lose sight of the 
important surveillance issues of the past and present, a phenomenon prevalent 
in popular media.10 This problem manifests itself in two related ways. First, it 
tends to mask surveillance means that, over time, fade into the background 
noise of life to the point that they become essentially invisible to all but the 
most careful observers. These means, which I collectively refer to in this Article 
as structural surveillance, are technology agnostic, tend to remove the traditional 
observer from the surveillance equation through an autonomic presence, and are 
remarkable only in their ordinariness.11 Second, due in large part to their meta-
invisibility, these means often provide an excellent blunt instrument of social 
control, and are therefore prone to abuse.12 This misuse, of course, can increase 
the visibility of these means, so they are often reserved for use within 
                                            
10 See, e.g., Edward Wyatt and Claire Cain Miller, Tech Giants Call for Limits on 
Government Surveillance of Users, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/technology/tech-giants-issue-call-for-
limits-on-government-surveillance-of-users.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Justin 
Fenton, Baltimore Police Used Secret Technology to Track Cellphones in 
Thousands of Cases, Baltimore Sun, Apr. 9, 2015, 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-
stingray-case-20150408-story.html#page=1; Reuters, U.S. Sets Up Intelligence 
Surveillance Technology Review Body, Aug. 12, 2013, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/12/us-usa-security-review-
idUSBRE97B0UT20130812. 
11 See Section II.B, infra.  
12 See Section III, infra. 
 6 
marginalized or otherwise disenfranchised segments of the population, who are 
less empowered to resist them.13 
One example of this phenomenon (which I will explore further elsewhere 
in this Article) can be found in the history of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.14 The fundamental precept of this text—forbidding all types of 
unreasonable searches and seizures—is deceptively simple in its ambiguity, yet 
the amendment clearly forbids the use of general warrants.15 The promiscuous 
government searches under the general warrant originated under early English 
law, and were well established as structural surveillance by the time members of 
Parliament began to protest their use in the 17th century.16 The source of the 
MPs’ consternation arose out of the Crown’s use of the general warrant against 
“gentlemen and dissenting Protestants” (two politically powerful 
demographics), when their only appropriate use (according to the MPs) was on 
“vagrants and Catholics.”17 
The American colonists of the 17th and early 18th centuries did not 
immediately inherit this distaste for the general warrant and other structural 
                                            
13 See Section IV, infra. 
14 Amendment IV, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. 
15 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 
757, 758 (1994). 
16 See Cuddihy at 134-140. 
17 See Cuddihy at 22-23. 
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surveillance, mainly because the articulate elites of these regions were the 
beneficiaries of these programs, through the collection of revenue and the 
suppression of insurrectionists in the colonial North, to slave patrols of the 
colonial South.18 It was not until England transformed in the eyes of elite 
colonists from Mother Country to Foreign Presence that American political 
leaders turned fully against the unreasonable searches and seizures of the 
Crown.19 In fact, revolutionary America presented something of a paradox with 
respect to structural surveillance. On the one hand, by the late 18th century, the 
existing constitutions of a majority of the original thirteen colonies contained 
some sort of provisions against unreasonable search and seizure, with 
opposition to such searches fading in intensity as one traveled further south.20 
On the other hand, the revolutionary governments saw fit to ignore these 
prohibitions when this structural surveillance presented expedient means to 
suppress dissent, control trade, crush slave rebellion, generated revenue, or 
control undesirable populations.21 Resistance to general warrants as structural 
surveillance was finally articulated when antifederalists, recognizing the negative 
                                            
18 See Cuddihy at 371-75. 
19 One of the earliest—and most forceful—arguments against British general 
warrants and writs of assistance arose out of Paxton’s Case (1761), where 
Massachusetts lawyer James Otis denounced the practice as “instruments of 
slavery” and reflected an absolutism that “cost one King of England his head and 
another his throne.” James Otis, Against Writs of Assistance, Address Before 
the Superior Court, February Term (1771), reprinted in 3 The Massachusetts 
Spy Or, Thomas’s Boston Journal, Apr. 1, 1773. 
20 Cuddihy at 603-13. 
21 Cuddihy at 613-34. 
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implications of an overly powerful central government, resulted in the drafting 
and ratification of a Bill of Rights.22 
So what drives political or social tolerance—or intolerance—for structural 
surveillance? It is not as if the means of structural surveillance always go 
unchallenged. While researching the history of claims challenging U.S. 
Government surveillance programs, I had begun work examining the near 
insurmountable obstacle of Article III standing facing these claimants.23 In 
nearly every one of these cases, courts held that plaintiffs had failed to show 
injury sufficient to bring a claim in U.S. Federal Courts.24 For a plaintiff to 
establish Article III standing, current jurisprudence requires the plaintiff to be 
able to show injury that is “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; 
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.”25 
Under this doctrine, an injury is not sufficient if it is based on a “speculative 
chain of possibilities,” a difficult evidentiary obstacle to overcome if you are 
                                            
22 See Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution 506-11 (1929); 
Catherine Drinker Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia 24-54 (1966). 
23 See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 
133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013); Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Committee v. Gray, 480 F.2d 
326 (2d Cir. 1973); New Alliance Party v. FBI, 858 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994). 
24 See Laird, 408 U.S. at 13-14 (the Court holding that “[a]llegations of a 
subjective ‘chill’ [due to knowledge of surveillance program] are not an adequate 
substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific 
future harm.”) 
25 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. CT. 1138, 1147 (2013)  (citations 
omitted). 
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challenging the constitutionality of a secret program.26 Even a showing of a high 
probability of injury is not enough to meet this requirement.27 The Supreme 
Court has even pointed out that, even if a denial of standing would mean that 
the constitutionality of a government program could never be foreseeably or 
meaningfully challenged, that fact alone is not enough to find standing.28 A high 
bar indeed. 
My initial research thus began as an exploration of the question of injury 
in surveillance cases, testing current jurisprudence against the claims of 
surveillance plaintiffs.29 While reading these cases, it began to occur to me that 
the vast majority of the challenges were to programs that were either highly 
technological in nature or otherwise exotic or sui generis. But the concept of 
surveillance is neither bound to a particular technology nor is it peculiar to a 
time or place—surveillance is as common as humanity itself. And while 
advances in technology can change the nature of surveillance, why does 
scholarship and case law tend to focus almost exclusively on recent programs 
that rely on sophisticated telecommunications networks and advanced 
computing technologies? Perhaps we are focusing on the wrong subjects when 
we ponder surveillance harms. Our attention is naturally drawn toward the new 
                                            
26 Amnesty cite 
27 Whitmore v. Arkansas 
28 Valley Forge Christian College (“the assumption that if respondents have no 
standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.”) 
29 ACLU v. Clapper; Amnesty v. Clapper. 
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and unique, often to the exclusion of the old and common. So what do we call 
surveillance that no longer meets these criteria? 
This research—beginning with this Article—is an attempt to closely 
examine the means of surveillance that have been outpaced by technology, yet 
still remain, if only as nearly-invisible background noise, and to quantify the 
individual and societal harms that stem from these common methods and 
programs. This surveillance, which I describe herein as structural surveillance, 
includes those measures that have, through legislation, codification, or cultural 
habit, have developed or calcified into systems that fit neatly within our 
accepted societal institutions, and have become so commonplace to become 
virtually indistinguishable from the backgrounds of our everyday lives.  
My research can be divided into two components. First, through this 
Article, I will lay out exactly what I mean by structural surveillance, describing 
its history and means, and beginning an exploration of its effects. From there, 
my research will turn toward an empirical study of these effects, the results of 
which will be described in future Articles. 
II. The Concept and History of Structural Surveillance 
A. Structural Surveillance and Structural Violence 
 
 11 
In his 1969 paper Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,30 Johan Galtung took 
on the difficult task of articulating a useful definition of violence. As a basis, 
Galtung started with the concept that “violence is present when human beings 
are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are 
below their potential realizations.”31 Violence, then, “is that which increases the 
distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the 
decrease of this distance.”32 Galtung’s definition operates within the context of 
influence relations, where the definition assumes an influencer (the subject), an 
influence (the object), and the mode of influence (the action).33 But how do we 
reason about violence when there is no direct subject in the standard relational 
triangle? Does it make sense to consider the case where someone is the object of 
violent action that is not directly attributable to a specific actor? Galtung 
reasoned that such a scenario must be accounted for, since there are clear 
instances of this type of violence that manifest as unequal power and unequal 
life opportunities.34  
The term Galtung coined to describe this category is structural violence—
violence built into societal structure that is just as meaningful as any other 
category of violence, yet becomes less visible due to its missing subject-action-
                                            
30 6 Journal of Peace Research 167 (1969). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id at 169. 
34 Id at 171. Galtung points to instances of institutional racism as examples of 
this subjectless violence, citing Stokely Carmichael’s work on  
 12 
object relationship.35 Structural violence becomes associated with a certain 
stability, and its deceptively “tranquil waters” attract less notice than the overt 
action (and actors) of personal violence.36 Within a stable society, personal 
violence—a stabbing, a shooting, a riot—stands out as an aberration, a deviation 
from the static social order, whereas structural violence is the order.37 Structural 
violence may indeed be understood and accepted by some as simply the price of 
stability, even if the costs are borne unequally across social divisions.38 
Giddens’s work provides a link between state violence (in the sense 
Galtung was describing) and state surveillance under a general theory of the 
sources of power.39 Giddens describes a society’s sources of power (and, 
ultimately, violence) using a container metaphor, where power is generated and 
stored through the concentration of resources, and is strongly influenced by the 
technologies available to that society.40 This power creation and “containment” 
is accomplished via surveillance in two senses. First, surveillance can enable the 
collection and, more importantly, storage of “coded information” relevant to the 
administration of the population in question.41 The introduction of digital 
communication has, of course, vastly expanded the possibilities for the 
collection of coded information, and has opened up new universes in the storage 
                                            
35 Id. See also Slavoj Vivik, Violence.  
36 Id at 173-74. 
37 Id. 
38 See Section XX, infra. 
39 Anthony Giddens, Nation-State at 12-14. 
40 Giddens at 13. 
41 Id. at 14. 
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and analysis of that information.42 Second, surveillance is employed in the 
“classical” sense, where the activities of one group are directly supervised by 
another.43 These methods can be useful within small societies without the aid of 
any particular organizational structure, but can only be scaled to larger societies, 
e.g., the modern nation-state, through the integration of advanced bureaucracies 
and network infrastructure, factors which are also greatly enhanced through the 
deployment of advanced technologies.44 
The piece of Giddens’s work that is most relevant to this research is his 
linking of surveillance to an organization’s control over the “timing and spacing” 
of human activities.45 Surveillance—specifically, the coding of information 
describing these activities—is critical to the state’s power/violence monopoly, 
because it provides a framework for effectively scaling direct supervision to 
nation-state sizes.46 This expansion of surveillance capabilities, as tightly 
integrated into our modern concept of governance, is thus both the vector 
                                            
42 A topical example of this can be found in the recent (and secretive) 
construction of the NSA’s massive data center near Bluffdale, Utah. See James 
Bamford, The NSA is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy Center (Watch What 
You Say), Wired, Mar. 15, 2012. Details about the facility are, of course, 
speculative, but experts have estimated the data storage capacities of the facility 
to be anywhere from 12 exabytes to 5 zettabytes. Kashmir Hill, Blueprints Of 
NSA's Ridiculously Expensive Data Center In Utah Suggest It Holds Less Info 
Than Thought, Forbes, Jul. 24, 2013. For reference, 1 zettabyte = 1,000 
exabytes = 1 billion petabytes = 1 trillion terabytes. 
43 Giddens at 14. 
44 See Eugene Litwak, Technological Innovation and Theoretical Functions of 
Primary Groups and Bureaucratic Structures, 73 Am. J. of Sociology 468 (1968). 
45 Giddens at 46-48. 
46 Id. 
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through which the modern large-scale bureaucracy is made possible, as well as 
the institutional means through which the state builds and contains power.47 
B. The Characteristics of Structural Surveillance 
Based in part on Gultung’s theory of structural violence, and Giddens’s 
links between power/violence and surveillance, I will consider the proposed 
concept of structural surveillance. As discussed supra, links between the state, 
violence, and surveillance are well established in the literature, and provide a 
foundation upon which to build this conceptual framework. My goal with this 
Article is twofold. First, I will develop a theoretical history and language 
through which one can reason about the means and effects of social control 
regimes that have become calcified within institutional structures to the point of 
normalcy. Second, I intend to use this theoretical framework to develop 
empirical explorations of these systems and their effects on the objects of 
surveillance.  
I define structural surveillance through two core characteristics—self-
reinforcement and ubiquity. By self-reinforcing, I mean those surveillance systems 
that have, through legislation, codification, or cultural habit, developed (or 
calcified) into systems where there is no easily identifiable watcher, and which 
seem to operate on their own, outside of normal means of control. By ubiquity, I 
do not necessarily mean that the system is uniform across all communities or 
populations, but instead refer to systems that have become commonplace to the 
                                            
47 Id. at 47-49. 
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extent that those outside its gaze either endorse or ignore its existence, and 
those under its gaze eventually accept it as woven into the fabric of reality. 
Together, these two characteristics create surveillance systems that appear to 
violate the usual subject-action-object power relationship, and fade into the 
background of our daily lives. 
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the concept of structural surveillance is 
through an example. The concept of city planning in America grew out of the 
demands of rapidly increasing populations, and the associated sudden need for 
transportation, commerce, public health, and public recreation facilities.48 
Following an extended period of instability and unrest in American cities in the 
mid-19th century, Frederick Law Olmsted, a landscape architect and journalist, 
proposed the creation of parks and other public spaces within cities to act as 
“social safety-valves,” where people from all socioeconomic classes could meet 
not only to enjoy common recreational pursuits and escape the stresses of the 
burgeoning city, but also to engage in civic society with minimal institutional 
control.49 The idea of public spaces has long had a place in the urban setting, but 
the concept experienced a rebirth in the Victorian city.50 Haussmann’s Paris 
provides another example of this philosophy, where public urban innovations 
such as the boulevard expanded access to all of a city’s inhabitants, and 
                                            
48 Olmsted, The Town Planning Movement in America, 172-74. 
49 See Mike Davis, City of Quartz (1990). 
50 See Peter Goheen, Public Space and the Geography of the Modern City, 22 
Progress in Human Geography 479 (1998). 
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democratized the public sphere in ways that existing institutions had little 
control over, a fact that made the governing class somewhat uncomfortable.51 
The public sphere had turned from an exclusive space to an inclusive space, both 
figuratively and literally.52 
It was not long before concerns over public safety and public health began 
to temper enthusiasm for public spaces.53 These concerns, both real and 
imagined, found fertile ground in the 19th century theories regarding the 
working classes and the poor generally.54 These “dangerous classes” were 
described as a persistent threat to the established social order, and attempts to 
alleviate poverty or ignorance were seen by social and economic philosophers as 
wasted efforts, as it was well understood that the lower classes were victims of 
their own defects, and accommodations such as increased access to public 
spaces would only serve to “raise the worthless above the worthy.”55 
It was, of course, true that controlling crime and otherwise maintaining 
order in public spaces posed a nontrivial challenge for 19th century governments, 
due in part to the fact that the concept of modern policing was only just 
                                            
51 See David Harvey, The Political Economy of Public Space. 
52 See Miles Ogborn, Ordering the City: Surveillance, Public Space and the reform of 
urban policing in England, 1835-56, 12 Political Geography 505–521 (1993); Peter 
G Goheen, Public space and the geography of the modern city, 22 Progress in Human 
Geography 479–496 (1998). 
53 See Henry Mayhew, London Labour and the London Poor: a cyclopaedia of the 
condition and earnings of those that will work, those that cannot work, and 
those that will not work (1851). 
54 See Malthus quote in Lydia Morris, Dangerous Classes at 10-11. 
55 Morris at 12. 
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beginning to take shape.56 The notion that a professionalized administrative 
body could be established not only to react to crimes already committed, but 
could proactively enforce social control on the streets to ensure “the general 
organization of city life” was something of a revolution.57 The introduction of 
regular police patrols in 19th century cities, along with the creation of related 
political and administrative mechanisms at all levels, reestablished social order 
and initiated the concept of modern policing.58  
This concept—a revolutionary and not uncontroversial innovation at the 
time—has become a permanent part of the fabric of modern governance, and 
with it, the Olmstedian concept of the minimally controlled public space has 
become increasingly enmeshed in structural surveillance. City squares and 
downtown streets now offer few, if any, spaces not visible to the gaze of closed 
circuit television (CCTV) cameras.59 Fear of crime, or more recently, terrorist 
activity, has driven an increased police presence which includes such recent 
innovations as portable watchtowers, arrays of microphones to triangulate the 
source of gunfire, electronic communications collection vans, and a general 
militarization of tactics, weaponry, and other equipment, which has all become 
                                            
56 Cite notes from Victorian policing folder 
57 Ogborn 507 
58 See Miles Ogborn, Ordering the City: Surveillance, Public Space and the reform of 
urban policing in England, 1835-56, 12 Political Geography 505–521 (1993); S 
Auerbach, “The Law Has No Feeling for Poor Folks Like Us!”: Everyday Responses to 
Legal Compulsion in England's Working-Class Communities, 1871-1904, 45 Journal of 
Social History 686–708 (2012). 
59 Paul Lewis, You're being watched: there's one CCTV camera for every 32 
people in UK, The Guardian, Mar. 2, 2011. 
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surprisingly commonplace in the relatively short time since the tragic events of 
September 11, 2001.60 
Thus, in the space of about 150 years, the public space has experienced a 
gradual introduction to surveillance means of widely differing levels of 
technological sophistication, with a rather sudden increase in methods in the 
years since 9/11. What we have witnessed in these changes is the establishment 
of structural surveillance in a particular public sphere. When these means—from 
the first establishment of regular police patrols to the installation of automated 
CCTV cameras—were first introduced, they were often noteworthy, if not 
controversial.61 But they were eventually accepted as unremarkable fixtures of 
everyday life (ubiquity), and were established through legislative or regulatory 
processes that effectively removed the easily identifiable watcher from the 
surveillance equation (self-reinforcement).62 As I will explore later in this 
Article, these means of structural surveillance, in our public spaces and 
                                            
60 For a general discussion of this topic, see The New Politics of Surveillance and 
Visibility, Haggerty and Ericson, eds. (2006); Radley Balko, Rise of the Warrior 
Cop (2013); Daryl Meeks, Police Militarization in Urban Areas: The Obscure 
War Against the Underclass, 35 The Black Scholar 33 (2006); Samuel Nunn, 
Police Technology in Cities: Changes and Challenges, 23 Technology in Society 
11 (2001); Fassin, Enforcing Order: An Ethnography of Urban Policing (2013). 
61 See Leon Hempel and Eric Topfer, The Surveillance Consensus: Reviewing the 
Politics of CCTV in Three European Countries, 6 European J. of Criminology 
157 (2009). 
62 See Section II.B, supra. 
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elsewhere, often place a substantial burden on the “dangerous classes” while the 
benefits tend to flow to the upper and governing classes.63 
C. Structural Surveillance as a Natural Result of the 
Information Society 
 
Of all the innovations that emerged from the industrial revolution, the 
advent of modern bureaucracy may well be the most successful, both in terms of 
longevity and scope.64 A defining characteristic of bureaucracy, and in turn, a 
strong inclination of modernity, is surveillance.65 Surveillance itself is, of course, 
nothing new, and it is important to separate the concept of surveillance from 
any particular era or technological phenomenon.66 In fact, social control and the 
                                            
63 See Section XX, infra. 
64 See Max Weber, Economy and Society (1978) 969-73; James R. Beniger, The 
Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information 
Society (1986) 7 [hereinafter Control Revolution]; Edward Higgs, The Rise of 
the Information State: The Development of Central State Surveillance of the 
Citizen in England, 1500-2000, 14 Journal of Hist. Sociology 175 (2001). 
65 See Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (1985); Ulrich Beck, 
Risk Society and the Provident State, in Risk, Environment and Modernity: 
Toward a New Ecology, Scott Lash et al., eds. (1998). Beck describes the need 
for increased surveillance as a direct result of industrial society, when the 
“social, political, ecological, and individual risks created by the momentum of 
innovation increasingly elude the control and protective institutions of industrial 
society.” Id. at 27. When these new or expanded risks outstrip the existing 
capacities of analysis, policy, or regulation to understand or cope with the issue, 
pressure is created to develop new methods of surveillance and control. 
66 The need for any society to regulate itself according to a set of values and 
principles is achieved through some form of social control. See Morris Janowitz, 
Sociological Theory and Social Control, 81 Am. Journ. of Sociology 82 (1975). 
Societies and civilizations have long used surveillance as a means of effecting 
social control through relatively simple means, including tax collection, census, 
and the apprehension of criminals. Higgs argues that the early origins of what 
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associated means of surveillance have advanced and adapted—often quite 
radically—over the millennia, in response to cultural and technological 
changes.67 Evolutions in social control become part of a feedback loop with the 
very structures of the society from which they emerge, a phenomenon I will 
return to in later sections of this Article.68 As communities became societies, as 
artisans turned to enterprises, as religious groupings emerged and morphed, and 
as markets emerged and expanded, values and principles evolved, and along 
with them the means—voluntary and coercive—of enforcement.69 
In the period from the mid-18th through mid-19th centuries, as 
industrialization in western nations began to create increasingly complex 
systems of interdependencies between manufacturing, capital, energy 
production, labor, and markets, new means of communication and control were 
                                                                                                                                  
we now consider the modern information state can be traced to early 16th 
century England. Higgs, The Rise of the Information State, supra.  
67 See Beniger, Control Revolution, supra at 61-64. Sociobiologists argue that 
the proto-organization and technology of self-replicating proteins and the 
molecular ordering of DNA initiated this process. See, generally, Richard 
Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 2d. ed. (1986). 
68 For example, rural life in pre-industrial England was made up of three classes: 
landowners, farmers, and laborers. Bertrand Russell, Freedom versus 
Organization: 1814-1914 51 (1934). Industrial life required only two classes—
owners and laborers. Id. at 67. While industrialization flattened somewhat the 
complex class relationships in England and elsewhere, social norms and values 
increased in complexity, attracting a new generation of political, economic, and 
social theorists to the tasks of making sense of changes to social order and 
reestablishing control over existing social structures. See, e.g., Thomas Malthus, 
An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798); Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment 
on Government (1776); James Mill, Elements of Political Economy (1821); 
David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817). 
69 See Max Weber, Economy and Society 26-28, 31-38 (1978). 
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required to take full advantage of new economies of scale and realize 
productivity levels unheard of under earlier forms of management and 
organization.70 Technological innovations in manufacturing and transportation 
brought with them new paradigms in social and economic thought and behavior, 
bringing an end to thousands of years of predominantly agricultural society, and 
therefore displacing the traditional means of social control without providing an 
immediately obvious replacement.71 The resulting dramatic increases in 
transactional speeds inevitably outpaced the existing modes of social control and 
interaction, and began to threaten the viability of incumbent institutions and 
structures.72 
I should note here what I mean when I use the term control within the 
scope of this Article. Here, I refer to control in its most general sense—to 
influence or direct behavior toward some predetermined goal. This definition is 
informed by the sociology literature, which examines the social relationship, the 
organization, voluntary or compulsory social participation, and consensual and 
imposed order.73 Hence, control, in this sense, is primarily concerned with the 
two elements of influence and purpose, and control theory—in both the 
                                            
70 See Beniger, Control Revolution, supra. 
71 Id. at 169-172.  
72 Beniger characterizes this phenomenon as a “crisis of control,” a period in 
which a society’s organizational, information processing, and communication 
capabilities are outpaced by manufacturing and transportation technologies, 
resulting in a systemic loss of political and economic control which threatens 
existing social and governmental institutions and structures. See Beniger, 
Control Revolution, supra at 7-9.  
73 See, e.g., Weber, Economy and Society supra., 46-53. 
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sociological and mathematical senses—require facilities for the communication 
and processing of information in order to manage behavior through feedback.74 I 
will introduce refinements to this definition in later sections, but for the time 
being, it will suffice to say that control here refers to any influence guided by 
purpose, however small. 
The 19th century crisis of control was not limited to industrial and 
commercial spheres.75 Societal and governmental institutions were also 
experiencing their own growing pains due also to the transformative effects of 
industrialization.76 The levels of communication and information processing 
necessary for control in preindustrial institutions could be generally be obtained 
through in-person interactions, and without the need for advanced technologies 
or extensive communications infrastructures.77 These methods did not work at 
the scales driven by industrialization, and institutions at most levels were 
seeking a means to restore the levels of control they once enjoyed.78  
                                            
74 See Richard Bellman, Control Theory, 211 Scientific Am. 186 (1964); J.W. 
Forrester, Industrial Dynamics: A Major Breakthrough for Decision Makers, 36 
Harvard Bus. Rev. 37 (1958); William T. Powers, Behavior: The control of 
perception (1973). 
75 Franklin F. Mendels, Proto-Industrialization: The First Phase of the 
Industrialization Process, 32 Journal of Econ. Hist. 241, 242-46 (Mar. 1972). 
76 See Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence. Giddens argues that the crisis of 
control brought about by industrialization required a dramatic change in the way 
the state viewed its citizens, as “no pre-modern states were able even to 
approach the level of administrative co-ordination developed in the [modern] 
nation-state.” Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity 57 (1990). 
77 See Beck, supra at 28.  
78 As Higgs points out, using the census as an example, “The older, parochial 
system was seen as inadequate” in its protection of property rights during 
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Correlative to the search by industrial, commercial, and governmental 
institutions for restored levels of control came the (re)emergence of the modern 
bureaucracy.79 The increasing amounts of information deemed necessary to 
efficiently operate the complex systems newly created by the modern state and 
commercial enterprise required an overhaul and expansion of the age-old 
concept of centralized administration, and the importance of bureaucracy as an 
essential tool in dealing with the modern crisis of control is difficult to 
overstate.80 Further, even with the benefit of an organized and centralized 
bureaucracy, a society is ultimately hamstrung in its ability to build and contain 
power by the limits of the technology available to that society.81 The limitations 
on an organization’s ability to gather and analyze Giddens’s coded information is 
                                                                                                                                  
industrialization, and therefore “the new system had to be generalised to all 
social classes in order to make it comprehensive – as in so many other ways, 
middle-class property rights had to be portrayed as universal human rights in 
order to make them enforceable.” Higgs at 181. 
79 Acknowledging the existence of bureaucracies and similarly organized 
administrative bodies prior to industrialization, Weber identifies the modern 
bureaucracy as a significant point of departure from these institutional types. 
Weber, Economy and Society, supra at 217.  
80 Reinhard Bendix notes that any study of modern bureaucracy must 
acknowledge both the challenges to and protections of individual freedoms: 
“[T]he modern critics of the ‘service state’ tend to forget that governmental 
‘interference’ has increased individual freedom by promoting social security, just 
as the earlier governmental aid in the development of corporate enterprise and 
western expansion increased the freedom of the business man.” Bendix, 
Bureaucracy and the Problem of Power, 5 Public Administration Review 194, 
195 (1945). 
81 Beniger at 9. 
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directly dependent upon its ability to communicate, store, and process that 
information, a characteristic described by Weber’s concept of rationalization.82 
The core idea behind rationalization is the proposition that a society’s 
creation and containment of power through control can increase either through 
increasing the society’s capability to process coded information, or by limiting 
the amount of that information to be processed.83 The modern state has 
modified this concept by maximizing both precepts: increasing information 
processing capability in order to effectively decrease the amount of information 
that is processed.84 The resulting organizations, processes, and technologies 
must therefore become part of the state’s evolved infrastructure, much as 
cooperative organ systems became integral to complex organisms. This 
description should not convey any sort of malign intent on the part of the state 
or its institutions—it is meant to be descriptive rather than normative, and 
merely illustrates the functions necessary for an administrative body of scale to 
operate and survive.85 
                                            
82 Id. at 15-16. 
83 Id. 
84 Cite list of refs in notes on big data analytics 
85 “[L]et all these enterprises be managed in bureaucratic ‘order,’ introduce 
state-supervised syndicates, and let the rest of the economy be regulated on the 
guild principle with innumerable certificates of competency, academic and 
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LVIII-LIX.  
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In fact, the state and similar social structures have emerged out of a 
natural desire to protect and promote societal institutions and their members.86 
The role of surveillance in these structures is to realize the goals of these 
structures in practice, taking such early forms of censuses and revenue collection 
in order to support social order through public safety, public health, and 
providing for the general welfare of its citizens or members.87 The ambiguity 
surrounding surveillance—especially structural surveillance—is in its dual 
nature: it acts both as means for a state to enforce rights and privileges granted 
to its citizens, while at the same time, providing the capabilities for states to use 
that same infrastructure to curtail those rights.88 This ambiguity over 
surveillance as a means of social control, and its effects as an integral part of our 
governmental systems, is what this research will explore.  
III. The Means of Structural Surveillance 
 
The explicit or implicit establishment of structural surveillance programs 
can in almost every instance be traced to benign social control mechanisms 
initiated for the benefit of (most of) the community. Challenges arising from 
growing populations, technological advances, the spread of disease, and external 
and internal threats to general order act as forcing functions on societies to 
                                            
86  See Weber, Economy and Society at 217-241. 
87 See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political 
Discussion (1991). 
88 Nicholas Abercrombie, et al. 
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establish means of meeting these challenges, or at least attenuating 
unmanageable fluctuations. The modern state arose in large part as an organized 
response to these challenges, building within itself the administrative and 
political power necessary to both achieve legitimacy and establish and enforce 
order within the community.89  
The late- and post-modern periods are marked by significant 
socioeconomic and political changes, beginning with western reconstruction 
efforts following World War II.90 This seismic shifting brought with it a growing 
sense of insecurity and fear of risk, a defining characteristic that Beck dubbed 
the “risk society.”91 The pathology of this outlook can be found in its self-
feeding concept of risk, in which the “social, political, ecological and individual 
risks created by the momentum of innovation increasingly elude the control and 
protective institutions of industrial society.”92 Thus, unstoppable progress has 
its own “systematically produced hazards” that will forever be beyond the 
current capabilities of protecting from these hazards.93 This outlook, along with 
the modernist quest for scientific and industrial innovation, combined to form a 
social control system that is forever chasing its own tail. 
                                            
89 Max Weber, Economy and Society, 31-35. 
90 See Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (2006). 
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Modernity: Toward a New Ecology, Lash, Szerszynski, and Wynne, eds. 26 
(1996). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
 27 
The examples that follow are not meant to be an exhaustive list of all 
forms of structural surveillance used today. Rather, I present a list of items to 
best highlight the range of structural surveillance means addressing an array of 
public concerns. An ongoing portion of this research will continue to catalog 
surveillance programs and methods to better understand the effects of these 
programs.94 
A. Public Safety 
Among the earliest societal needs to be addressed by the revolutionary 
strains of social and economic thought that emerged along side Western 
industrialization in the 18th and 19th centuries was that of public safety.95 As 
populations increasingly migrated to cities in search of work, the resources of 
metropolitan areas immediately began to feel the strain of such rapid growth.96 
Existing social control mechanisms were no longer effective at the scales 
required by burgeoning cities, and there was a deep concern among the upper 
classes with political disorder, criminality, and threats to the existing social 
                                            
94 See Section V infra. 
95 See Policing the Victorian Community, Policing the Victorian Community 
(2015); C L Brace, The Dangerous Classes of New York: And Twenty Years' 
Work Among Them (1880). 
96 See Charles Loring Brace, The Dangerous Classes of New York (1880); 
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order.97 These concerns were often conflated into a general fear and dislike of 
the “dangerous classes” as the primary source of social disruption.98 
Social reformers such as Bentham identified criminality and similar anti-
social behaviors as symptoms—addressing these issues would not solve the 
ultimate problem of regulating the growing instability of industrialized city 
life.99 Rather, social order would only be restored by ensuring that the working 
classes were encouraged to adhere closely to the preexisting social norms.100 
This encouragement was described in terms such as “inspection,” “regulation,” 
and the “general prevention” of undesired conduct.101 Short of calling in the 
military, however, states did not have a secure monopoly on the means of 
violence, which made policing this conduct messy and difficult.102 
Robert Peel became England’s Home Secretary in 1822, and brought with 
him experience in policing, having set up the Dublin “Peace Preservation Force” 
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98 See Joe Soss, Richard C Fording & Sanford F Schram, Disciplining the poor: 
Neoliberal paternalism and the persistent power of race (2011). 
99 Bentham, Introduction to Principles of Morals and Legislation. 
100 See Lydia Morris, Dangerous classes : the underclass and social citizenship 
(1994). 
101 Id. 
102 See id.; S Auerbach, “The Law Has No Feeling for Poor Folks Like Us!”: Everyday 
Responses to Legal Compulsion in England's Working-Class Communities, 1871-1904, 45 
Journal of Social History 686–708 (2012); Miles Ogborn, Ordering the city: 
surveillance, public space and the reform of urban policing in England 1835–56, 12 
Political Geography 505–521 (1993). Tadhg O' Ceallaigh, Peel and Police Reform in 
Ireland, 1814-18, 6 Studia Hibernica 25–48 (1966). 
 29 
in 1814.103 While there were various police units operating in London at the 
time, these forces focused mainly on the protection of property, and did not 
have the resources or organization to engage in the sort of preventive policing 
Bentham and others had in mind.104 Peel argued that the primary goal of his 
organized police force should be crime prevention and moral order, with a focus 
on subduing the “dangerous classes,” and by consolidating the authority within 
a centralized administrative body, could pursue this goal far more efficiently 
than the existing models.105  
Here, we see the beginnings of a system of structural surveillance at 
work. By institutionalizing a public safety role that had largely been left to 
private interests, ad-hoc local governments, or the Crown (via the military), a 
consolidated and professionalized preventive police force replaced the 
identifiable object (watcher) in the surveillance equation with the society (via 
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government) itself (self-reinforcement). Further, a regulated police force 
ensured a uniformity—in action, purpose, and aesthetic—that could not be 
achieved under the existing systems, which aided public acceptance of the 
system and ensured its integration into everyday life (ubiquity). And as we will 
see, this system of modern policing, while allowing for effective scales not 
possible under earlier regimes, encouraged wholesale increases in information 
collection and management, which increased efficiency while at the same time, 
enabled abuse. 
To illustrate these concepts in contemporary terms, I will build upon the 
public space example I outlined earlier in this Article.106 The Olmstedian 
philosophy of public space as democratized geography, where open access to all 
classes of society was not only allowed, but encouraged, was not without its 
problems. Crime was certainly present, but there was a deeper concern (held 
principally by the upper classes) regarding general social disorder.107 From this 
general public safety concern arose four interrelated systems of structural 
surveillance: broken windows policing, widespread CCTV use, suspicionless 
stop and frisk policies, and algorithmic policing.  
In 1982, Wilson and Kelling published their influential “Broken 
Windows” article, which suggested that police could more efficiently address 
crime by targeting social disorder and nuisance crimes directly, thereby breaking 
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the cycle of localized community decline.108 The basis for this thinking can be 
found in what has been called the incivilities thesis, which proposes that social 
disorder in a community leads to an increased fear of crime in that community’s 
residents, which in turn leads to a general civic withdrawal from the 
community.109 The theory concludes that this withdrawal feeds into a cycle of 
general community decline in the levels of social control, which leads to 
increased localized crime and disorder.110  
The broken windows policing concept took hold quickly among the police 
departments of major American cities, and is arguably one of the most 
important changes to policing in recent decades.111 Implementations of broken 
windows policing have varied in tactics from department to department, 
adopting different strategic approaches ranging in aggressiveness, the most 
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visible example of which was adopted by the New York City Police 
Department.112 The “New York style” of broken windows policing was initiated 
in 1993 as the “quality of life” initiative, focusing on nuisance offenses that had 
been ignored under earlier regimes, including turnstile jumping, panhandling, 
and public drinking.113 Within a relatively short period of time after the 
introduction of the new initiative, New York City’s overall crime rate began to 
drop, an occurrence almost universally attributed to the “smarter policing” of 
the broken windows theory.114  
The perceived success of broken windows policing in New York City 
initiated a wave of adoption of the practice in other major cities, including 
Chicago, Los Angeles, Baltimore, and Boston, which soon began to attribute 
their own success stories to the new approach.115 Proponents of the broken 
windows policing method pointed to a key component of its success: the full 
integration of widespread data collection, information technology, and statistical 
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analysis to policing.116 This analytical approach was viewed as an ideal solution 
to the crisis of control then affecting law enforcement, and was just the sort of 
enhancement desired (or required) within an information society.117 The data 
collection effort did not necessarily require any advanced technologies. Simply 
saturating a particular neighborhood, subway stop, or park with police patrols 
would generate a massive amount of actionable information, a benefit 
highlighted by broken windows proponents: 
Our experience is that most citizens like to talk to a police officer. 
Such exchanges give them a sense of importance, provide them 
with the basis for gossip, and allow them to explain to the 
authorities what is worrying them…. You approach a person on 
foot more easily, and talk to him more readily, than you do a 
person in a car. Moreover, you can more easily retain some 
anonymity if you draw an officer aside for a private chat. Suppose 
you want to pass on a tip about who is stealing handbags, or who 
offered to sell you a stolen TV. In the inner city, the culprit, in all 
likelihood, lives nearby. To walk up to a marked patrol car and lean 
in the window is to convey a visible signal that you are a “fink.”118 
A (possibly unexpected) enhancement of the information collection 
process came directly from the aggressive pursuit of nuisance crimes. Police 
departments soon discovered that their overall surveillance efforts would benefit 
from the creation of informants through misdemeanor arrests.119 Not only were 
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those arrested possible sources of information on others, their biometric data 
(fingerprints, DNA) could be collected for indefinite storage and analysis in 
other investigations.120 These methods were seen as so successful and necessary 
that they quickly became the driver of broken windows policies rather than a 
mere by-product.121  
Coinciding with the rise of broken windows policing policies came the 
technological innovation of closed circuit television (CCTV) deployment.122 
                                            
120 Bernard E Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken windows: New evidence from New York 
City and a five-city social experiment, The University of Chicago Law Review 271–
320 (2006); Brian A Reaves, Police departments in large cities, 1990-2000 
(2011); John A Eterno & Eli B Silverman, Understanding police management: A 
typology of the underside of compstat, 5 Professional Issues in Criminal Justice: A 
Professional Journal 11–28 (2010); Beth Pearsall, Predictive policing: The future of 
law enforcement, 266 National Institute of Justice Journal 16–19 (2010); J J Willis, 
S D Mastrofski & T Rinehart Kochel, Recommendations for Integrating Compstat and 
Community Policing, 4 Policing 182–193 (2010); Steve Herbert, Policing the 
contemporary city: Fixing broken windows or shoring up neo-liberalism? 5 Theoretical 
Criminology 445–466 (2001); John A Eterno & Eli B Silverman, The New York 
City police department's Compstat: dream or nightmare? 8 International Journal of 
Police Science & Management 218–231 (2006); Mike King, “Broken Windows,” 
Urban Policing, and the Social Contexts of Race and Neighborhood (Dis-)Empowerment, 
21 Critical Criminology 533–538 (2013). 
121 See Mike King, “Broken Windows,” Urban Policing, and the Social Contexts of Race 
and Neighborhood (Dis-)Empowerment, 21 Critical Criminology 533–538 (2013). 
122 See Ann Rudinow S a etnan, Heidi Mork Lomell & Carsten Wiecek, 
Controlling CCTV in Public Spaces: Is Privacy the (Only) Issue? Reflections on Norwegian 
and Danish observations, 2 Surveillance \& Society (2004); B J Goold, CCTV and 
policing: public area surveillance and police practices in Britain (2004); Heather 
Cameron, CCTV and (In) dividuation, 2 Surveillance \& Society (2004); Clive 
Norris & Michael McCahill, CCTV: beyond penal modernism? 46 British Journal of 
Criminology 97–118 (2006); B J Goold, CCTV and policing: public area 
surveillance and police practices in Britain (2004); Benjamin J Goold, Public area 
surveillance and police work: the impact of CCTV on police behaviour and autonomy, 1 
Journal of Surveillance and Society 191–203 (2003); Emmanuel Martinais & 
 35 
Rapid improvements in digital camera and information processing technologies 
made widespread CCTV deployment attractive as a low-cost means of 
augmenting or replacing police patrols.123 Widely adopted by London authorities 
in the early- and mid-1990s, the CCTV system was hailed as the “Friendly Eye 
in the Sky” to skeptical London residents, targeting only those who acted 
suspiciously.124 Two high-profile events—the unsuccessful bombing 
assassination attempt against then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and a 
grainy CCTV recording of a London toddler being lured away by his 10-year-old 
killers—fueled general anxiety in England over public disorder, and led to a 
flood of government spending on the installation of CCTV systems throughout 
England and Europe generally.125  
Cities in the United States were slower to adopt CCTV, with only 
sporadic deployment in the late 1990s, and then only using them “primarily to 
monitor pedestrian traffic in downtown and residential districts.”126 A 
combination of technological advances, dropping costs, and the events of 9/11 
finally drove U.S. cities to adopt CCTV in a wide variety of public safety 
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spheres.127 A renewed focus on public safety post-9/11 created an environment 
where 
almost all cities have become more frightening to their inhabitants, 
albeit with the fear often out of proportion to the reality. 
Increasing mobility of criminals means that no area is safe from 
crime. Attempts are being made to shield areas and make them as 
safe as possible, sometimes by cutting them off or controlling them 
through closed circuit television systems.128 
The growth of first generation CCTV systems was still hindered by the 
fact that these cameras still required a human being to monitor, interpret, and 
act on their data.129 This created a number of other potential problems, including 
questions of access, voyeurism, and other potential CCTV abuses.130 A post-9/11 
flurry of video- and image-processing research yielded a second generation of 
CCTV systems, capable of automating the intelligence gathering process 
through advanced analysis algorithms.131 Not only did these second generation 
CCTV systems increase the amount of information that could be gleaned from 
real-time video, but it also addressed some of the other concerns posed by 
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human-in-the-loop monitoring.132 The deployment of advanced CCTV systems 
gave police departments an inexpensive new source of information for collection 
and processing as well as other, unrelated benefits, such as revenue generation, 
making their ubiquitous adoption a foregone conclusion.133  
Despite these advances, CCTV still had its limits. CCTV systems could 
watch, unblinking, for unlimited amounts of time, but even the most advanced 
systems could not replace the surveillance value of a police officer on the street. 
Under the broken windows policing model, police departments found that a 
great deal of useful information could be gathered from the subjects of nuisance 
crime arrests.134 As police departments’ information systems demanded 
additional data from its officers, however, new sources of that information had 
to be found. In New York City and elsewhere, police departments began to 
employ an expanded use of the Terry stop as part of their broken windows 
toolkit.135 These stops, which came to be known as “stop and frisk” searches, fell 
under a policy of “non-arrest approaches” to citizens, and blended well with an 
increase in “gun-oriented policing” in multiple departments.136 The 
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performance-measurement system employed by Compstat incentivized police 
departments and officers to aggressively employ stop and frisk practices, and 
effectively lowered the bar for such stops, allowing for an expansive definition of 
an officer’s “reasonable suspicion.”137 
Of course, once data generated by structural surveillance begins to arrive 
in increasing amounts, police systems such as Compstat must find a way to 
make sense of this information. There are two aspects to this process: dynamic 
analysis, where information is collected, organized, analyzed, and the results 
disseminated in real-time (or near-real-time), allowing for direct action and 
deployment; and static analysis, which takes advantage of the fact that digital 
data storage has become an effectively no-cost operation, and performs pattern 
analysis retroactively to direct and adjust police deployment strategy.138 Neither 
of these tasks are revolutionary by themselves, but the increased data flows and 
information processing capabilities that have followed in the wake of broken 
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windows policing strategies have made available to police departments unheard 
of levels of analytical tools and have enabled the use of algorithmic policing.139 
Generally speaking, algorithmic policing is nothing more than an 
automated version of the approach described in Wilson’s and Kelling’s original 
article.140 But instead on relying on human-centered processes of surveillance 
and analysis, it uses information technology to integrate massive amounts of 
intelligence data from multiple sources, including police reports, arrest records, 
DNA and fingerprint data, CCTV, and license plate readers, and provide 
automated, rapid situational analysis to police and other government agencies.141 
Algorithmic policing is a relatively new addition to the broken windows policing 
repertoire, aided in large part through the increasing numbers of “fusion” 
operations between traditional law enforcement and national security and 
terrorism agencies.142 The resulting blurring of lines between traditional policing 
and national security concerns has led to skepticism over these new programs, 
but such operations have continued to grow in the current post-9/11 public 
safety environment.143 
Here we see the transformation of broken windows policing and 
associated programs into structural surveillance. By making the information 
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processing system—known as Compstat in New York and emulated elsewhere—
the primary and direct consumer of surveillance data, police departments 
effectively removed the watcher (object) from the surveillance equation. Police 
officers were encouraged to gather intelligence information not for their own 
immediate purposes, but to be fed into Compstat for analysis and 
dissemination.144 This incentivized the individual police officer to act more like a 
surveillance collection device and less as a professional, trained in crime 
detection and prevention.145 Further, the Compstat system required ever 
increasing amounts of information, which drove police departments to increase 
patrols and nuisance crime arrests, a strategy that generated dramatic increases 
in the sizes of police departments, an ironic result for a policy meant to make 
more efficient use of static or shrinking numbers of available officers.146 When 
the system required more information, departments turned to high-tech 
solutions like CCTV as well as additional low-tech solutions, like stop-and-frisk 
policies. And as the information flow became larger, departments implemented 
increasingly sophisticated analysis systems, such as algorithmic policing, to 
manage the increased bandwidth. 
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Superficially, this approach appears valid because the underlying concerns 
appear valid, but there is a problem with the theory’s asserted essentialism with 
respect to the perception of disorder. Signals of social disorder are not 
unambiguous, and there is no agreed-upon natural meaning of disorder.147 This 
is not to say that there are not certain signals of social disorder, such as rotting 
garbage, litter, discarded drug paraphernalia, graffiti, and abandoned cars, that 
are posited by broken windows theorists as objective measures of disorder or 
decay, but perceptions of disorder often carry with them an implicit bias, and 
will directly affect who benefits from broken windows policing, and who bears 
its burdens.148 Studies of the effects of broken windows policing and its 
associated means of structural surveillance on poor and minority populations 
over the past decade have generated a strong body of empirical evidence 
showing that these populations bear a significantly disproportionate amount of 
the burden of these systems.149 There are a number of reasons behind these 
results, but chief among them is the implicit linking of social disorder with a 
limited number of certain kinds of criminal behavior—the majority of which 
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tended to exist only in minority or poor neighborhoods—along with a “zero 
tolerance” approach to these selected behaviors.150  
The result of this policy created a system of structural surveillance with 
the notional goal of dynamically preventing crime and improving the quality of 
life and access within a city, but with the ironic result of establishing permanent 
or static means of surveillance in certain “bad” neighborhoods, containing rather 
than eliminating disorder, and reinforcing the growth of private or semi-public 
spaces which curtail the Olmstedian view of public access.151 These 
contemporary policies are often justified using many of the same rationales 
(albeit with carefully softened language) as those found in the 19th century 
policies designed to control and subdue the “dangerous classes.”152 We thus find 
ourselves with a growing system of structural surveillance, created in the name 
of public safety, that certain portions of the populations see as necessary and/or 
nearly invisible, while other portions of the population—those forced to live 
under its perpetual gaze—are left to choose between grudging acceptance or 
outright hostility, both of which result in negative individual and societal 
effects.153 
[Possibly address national security angle here] 
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B. Social Programs 
The management of government services and public welfare programs is 
as old as government itself.154 The crisis of control that arose with the rapid 
population growth and urbanization of 18th and 19th century industrialization 
inspired governments to seek methods to manage their burgeoning 
underclasses.155 The pseudo-sciences of social Darwinism and eugenics gained 
fast traction in Europe and the United States, bolstered in large part by the 
widely shared opinion among the governing elites of those nations that the 
“dangerous classes” were made up of physically, psychologically, and morally 
inferior beings.156 This gave governments—and their increasingly efficient 
bureaucracies—the moral cover they needed to begin the promulgation of social 
engineering programs on a large scale, meant either to improve those few among 
the lower classes who could possibly be redeemed through education and hard 
                                            
154 One of the chief problems faced by early governments was the provision and 
management of social services. Records from the ancient societies of 
Mesopotamia, China, India, Egypt, Greece, Persia, and Rome identify multiple 
methods—some more successful than others—to manage economic, financial, 
and social aspects of public welfare. See, e.g., Salvador Carmona & Mahmoud 
Ezzamel, Accounting and accountability in ancient civilizations: Mesopotamia and ancient 
Egypt, 20 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 177–209 (2007). In 9th 
century England, William I’s Domesday Book was an explicit attempt to record 
the identities and assets of the entire kingdom, thus categorizing his subjects by 
wealth (and worth). See Paul Henman & Greg Martson, The Social Division of 
Welfare Surveillance, 37 Journal of Social Policy 187–205 (2008).  
155 See Lydia Morris, Dangerous classes : the underclass and social citizenship 
(London ; New York : Routledge) (1994) 10-16; John Gilliom, Overseers of the 
Poor (University of Chicago Press) (2001) 24-25. 
156 See id. at 23-26. 
 44 
work, or in the alternative, somehow separate this “residuum” before it could 
further corrupt the morally and physically superior “flower of the population.”157 
Early efforts to ameliorate the problem of the underclass in an organized 
way can be traced to the Poor Law Act of 1601, signed by England’s Queen 
Elizabeth I to organize a structure to support local overseers to tax property for 
the express purpose of aiding the poor.158 The effect of these laws was to clearly 
separate local members from the community from outsiders so that local 
parishes could satisfy the edict by aiding the poor within their community while 
being legally—and morally—justified in denying relief to strangers.159 This legal 
divide, along with a later set of laws that separated the “deserving” from the 
“undeserving” poor, set a precedent that our social programs still contain, to 
varying degrees, today.160 But this ability for governments to use the structural 
components of social welfare to alienate based on gender, race, religion, or other 
categorizations did not scale well beyond the parish until the control revolution 
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brought on by industrialization brought important advances in structural 
surveillance techniques and technologies. 
As societies and politics evolved throughout the 20th century, reform 
movements drove early versions of what we would now recognize as modern 
social welfare programs, while still retaining elements of the 
deserving/undeserving distinction of earlier regimes.161 The United States, 
taking a federalist approach based somewhat on the local, parish-based British 
model, organized most of its social welfare structure at the state and local 
level.162 Federal government agencies took a more active role during the Great 
Depression and through the programs of the New Deal, but these efforts largely 
became support mechanisms for state and local social service programs.163 And 
apart from a brief moment of optimism in 1964 when the federal government 
expressed its intent “not only to relieve the symptoms of poverty, but to cure it 
and, above all, to prevent it,” the chief goal of government social welfare was, at 
best, a means of managing the problem of poverty, and later, to act as a service 
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conduit for the low end of capitalism, providing labor on the employer’s terms, 
and freezing out those unable to satisfy these “work first” requirements.164 
A key component of managing the poor—as opposed to managing 
poverty—was the continuous monitoring of those applying for or receiving 
welfare benefits.165 Notionally beneficial to the continued improvement of 
government program efficiencies, these data were also quite useful in the 
pursuit of social control and the conferment by government of individual 
identity.166 Recipients—or “clients”—of these systems were required to become 
open books for government inspection in exchange for services.167 This meant 
that the government’s “friendly visitor,” acting as both counselor and 
investigator/inspector, was to be given a free hand to complete the required 
“searching examinations.”168 To support this goal, elaborate systems—both 
technological and otherwise—of structural surveillance were implemented to 
enforce work requirements, spot fraud, and often stigmatize, humiliate, and 
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alienate social services recipients.169 The methods include “suitable home” 
inspections, “man in the house” searches, means testing, labor testing, residency 
checks, and random drug testing, all without a warrant, and all in the name of 
social ordering and social control.170 
Modern social welfare systems have taken an especially disciplinary turn 
since the late 20th century, which has had an especially deleterious effect on 
minority populations, especially African Americans.171 And while it is obvious 
that large scale information collection and record keeping is a critical part of any 
government social service program, current structural surveillance systems also 
provide the means to stigmatize, scrutinize, and otherwise manage population 
segments who are least able to resist such methods.172 This goes to the heart of 
structural surveillance—a complex system of information collection and record 
keeping that, over time, becomes a part of the background noise of society, 
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visible only to those who administer it or who have the misfortune of being 
under its gaze. As I will show in the following section, these systems can cause 
significant damage to subsets of society, even when those systems are notionally 
in place for the benefit of all. 
IV. The Effects of Structural Surveillance 
 
As I described earlier in this Article, the self-reinforcement and ubiquity 
of structural surveillance allows for its uneven application across population 
segments, which often results in unequal effects across society.173 As we have 
seen, these unequal effects are often borne by vulnerable, disenfranchised, or 
stigmatized populations, which can lead to lasting—and very real—societal, 
economic, and civic harms. This section is an attempt to characterize and 
categorize these harms by examining the existing literature relevant to the 
structural surveillance examples described above.174 It is not meant to be an 
exhaustive cataloging of such effects. Rather, I intend it as a springboard for the 
next phase of this research. 
A. Enforcement of Social Ordering 
Among the chief (ab)uses of structural surveillance throughout history is 
the practice of establishing and maintaining otherwise artificial social 
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structures.175 The aggressive attention paid to the “dangerous classes” in 
Victorian societies is not much abated in today’s environment, although the 
supporting language has softened somewhat, and the uses of structural 
surveillance more subtle.176 As discussed above, in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, modernist optimism toward social control through scientific methods 
combined with existing fears of a growing underclass and contemporary 
scholarship which regarded the poor and working classes as fundamentally 
flawed, to create social control mechanisms oriented toward the preservation of 
existing social ordering.177 Many of these policies were removed or changed 
through the social reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, only to reappear, dressed in 
slightly different clothing, in the 1980s.178  
Gandy referred to the contemporary commercial version of this 
mechanism the “panoptic sort,” which used consumer surveillance to sort 
people based on their value to the marketplace, and suggested that this analysis 
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could be applied to other social spheres.179 The technological advances of the late 
20th century made social ordering through structural surveillance a particularly 
serious problem, especially following the increased focus on public safety 
following 9/11—the ordering could be economic, political, racial, or based on 
any sort of slicing and dicing one could do with the growing amounts of 
available data.180 The effects of this ordering can be very real, limiting economic 
and spatial mobility, social and political opportunities, and civic engagement 
much more effectively than the Victorian legacy methods, due to the speed and 
mobility of these structural surveillance systems.181 
Returning to my ongoing example of public space, one can see the effects 
of social ordering by examining the regulation or closing of public spaces as it 
relates to the homeless population. As I discussed earlier, the Olmstedian idea 
of open access public spaces in cities began to slowly erode throughout the latter 
half of the 20th century, as American city planners shifted from the (Olmstedian) 
“planned” city to the “entrepreneurial” or “post-industrial” city.182 Open access 
                                            
179 Gandy, The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information 
(1993). 
180 See danah boyd & Kate Crawford, CRITICAL QUESTIONS FOR BIG DATA: 
Provocations for a cultural, technological, and scholarly phenomenon, 15 Information, 
Communication \& Society 662–679 (2012). 
181 See id.; Torin Monahan, Surveillance and Inequality, 5 Surveillance \& Society xx 
(2002); David Apgar, The False Promise of Big Data: Can Data Mining Replace 
Hypothesis-Driven Learning in the Identification of Predictive Performance Metrics?: The 
False Promise of Big Data, 32 Systems Research and Behavioral Science 28–49 
(2015); Venkat N Gudivada, Ricardo Baeza-Yates & Vijay V Raghavan, Big Data: 
Promises and Problems, Computer 20–23 (2015). 
182 Hall 
 51 
public spaces were often redesignated “private” or “quasi-public,” and the 
introduction of broken windows policing and associated methods led to 
increased monitoring of these spaces and police (and private) patrolling of de 
jure and de facto borders.183 Homeless people—defined loosely here as those 
who do not have access to their own private space or home—are forced to live 
their lives in public spaces.184 As these spaces disappear or become more tightly 
regulated and patrolled by authorities, the options for the homeless population 
dwindle. 
The effects of social ordering can also be seen in the increased use of stop 
and frisk and investigatory stops under broken windows policing and the war on 
drugs.185 Both of these methods are widely used when a police officer develops a 
“reasonable suspicion” about the person to be stopped, often supported by an 
officer’s opinion that the person “looked out of place.”186 This often meant that 
the subject of surveillance was either poor or a racial minority (or both) 
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observed in a largely white or upper class community, a not-so-distant relative 
of the illegal redlining policies that were once used to contain the poor and 
minorities within certain neighborhoods outside of wealthier, whiter areas.187 
The investigatory stop has avoided the racist stigma of redlining—at least in a 
legal sense—due to the gradual institutionalization of the practice under broken 
windows policing.188 The practice has since become a fixture of structural 
surveillance, and is now considered routine practice among police 
departments.189 The irony of these policies, often touted as means of “reclaiming 
open spaces” for the safe enjoyment of all, can be found in the resulting 
reclaiming of spaces for some to the exclusion of others.190 
A recent example of this institutionalized practice can be found in 
Arizona law S.B. 1070, which, under the veil of immigration control, required 
local and state police officers to determine the immigration status of anyone 
stopped, detained, or arrested when the officer.191 This requirement, 
affectionately deemed the “show me your papers” provision, was upheld by the 
Supreme Court as constitutional in 2012, with the proviso that officers must 
first have has a “reasonable suspicion” that they are not in the United States 
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legally.192 Like similar investigatory stops, the Arizona provision is likely to 
incentivize police officers to base their surveillance inquiries on the ethnicity 
and socioeconomic status of the subject.193  
There is strong empirical evidence that these “out of place” stops are 
more likely to happen to “out of place” minorities than “out of place” whites.194 
The effect is to convey strongly to poor and minority populations that their place 
in society is below white and upper class populations.195 Studies have shown 
that the subjects of these stops are often made to feel like second-class citizens 
whose lives are under the constant scrutiny and judgment of a capricious 
state.196 
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This effect is also clearly visible through government social relief policies, 
especially since the wave of welfare reforms initiated in the 1980s under the 
Reagan administration, and again in the 1990s under the Clinton 
administration.197 These policies were written to be punitive to existing 
recipients of public aid, and discouraging to potential applicants, through 
practices such as means testing, stigmatization, warrantless searches, residency 
requirements, and even through the enlistment of informants.198 Recipients of 
welfare under these programs describe feeling as if they were in prison, as 
powerless, and as not worthy of basic human dignity.199 They describe 
themselves as defenseless subjects of a faceless an often-hostile bureaucracy, 
stripped of basic privacy rights, and powerless to complain about any of this, as 
it would likely incur the risk the loss of benefits.200 
Another, more subtle, yet no less corrosive result of these policies is a 
growing fear and mistrust of our fellow citizens. The modern idea of the public 
sphere depends heavily on our ability to have “ubiquitous and uncontrolled 
encounters of people and groups” in our shared areas without barriers—both 
literal and figurative—erected to enforce an artificial social order.201 
Hypervigilant concern for matters of ethnic identity and socioeconomic strata 
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has, time and again, led to a fear for physical security that leads to a feedback 
loop of ordering.202 Structural surveillance programs in the form of “crime 
control” very often target racial minorities or the economic underclass largely for 
the benefit of wealthier citizens. These programs and policies will pit citizen 
against citizen, leading to fear-based discriminatory choices in education, social 
services, corrections, and the availability of economic opportunities.203 Even—or 
perhaps especially—within the quasi-public sphere of the workplace, the 
deployment and use of structural surveillance creates an atmosphere of mistrust 
that can prove ultimately counterproductive to the employer.204  
B. Fear and Mistrust of Institutions 
One of the most dangerous effects of structural surveillance is its role in 
the loss of trust in societal institutions. An extensive body of literature has been 
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written over the past few decades on the topic of political trust, with a renewed 
interest following the events of 9/11.205 Much of this work has concentrated on 
macro-level studies of confidence in government at its uppermost levels, and the 
overall effects this has on public support for government action and the 
allocation of resources.206 For the purposes of this Article, however, I wish to 
focus on the issue of trust in a wider set of institutions, including the police, 
public health, and public assistance organizations, which ultimately affects 
citizens’ general attitudes toward government in general. The societal dangers of 
intense and prolonged cynicism and feelings of alienation are, I believe, best 
examined from the bottom-up rather than the top-down, since grassroots 
disaffection can be a slow burning flame, often ignored at the macro level until 
things go horribly wrong.207 
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A recent article by African-American journalist Nikole Hannah-Jones 
describes an example these effects in detail.208 While celebrating the July 4 
holiday with her friends and family on Long Island, Hannah-Jones and a few 
others decided to take a walk on the beach. The pleasant evening was 
interrupted by the sound of gunshots. The shooter quickly disappeared, and 
Hannah-Jones quickly checked to see if anyone was hurt, and noted that the 
high school intern who was staying with them at the time was on the phone 
with the police. This shocked the four adults in the group, who were all 
journalists with advanced degrees, and also happened to be black—none of them 
had considered calling 911 due to the “very real possibility of inviting disrespect, 
even physical harm.” The group “feared what could happen if police came 
rushing into a group of people who, by virtue of our skin color, might be 
mistaken for suspects.”  
Hannah-Jones points out that her thoughts on this topic are not unique 
within the African-American and Latino populations, for whom policing and 
structural surveillance have been a means of social ordering and control. These 
means have been well documented in the literature concerning the Jim Crow 
South, and black experiences in Northern cities during the Great Migration.209 
As Hannah-Jones’s experiences illustrate, however, the structural surveillance 
mechanisms that remain can still serve these purposes. Not long after Hannah-
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Jones’s guest began her 911 call with the police that July 4, the conversation 
turned accusatory and adversarial, with the officer asking her “Are you really 
trying to be helpful, or are you involved in this?” Hannah-Jones describes the 
frightening and humiliating effects of being under constant suspicion by a 
system of structural surveillance that is viewed as benign and/or invisible by the 
white population, and concludes that, while African-American communities 
desire a healthy and respectful relationship with the police and the state, the 
“countless slights and indignities” that stem from our system of structural 
surveillance will “build until there’s an explosion.” 
These effects are not limited to minority populations, of course. We see 
these same outcomes whenever structural surveillance is deployed to suppress 
or control marginalized populations.210 For example, Gilliom’s work on the 
surveillance of the poor provides an excellent illustration of the consequences of 
alienation.211 He describes a population of “frightened, often lonely, women and 
children who live on the edge of hunger and homelessness and in fear of their 
caseworkers and their neighbors,” who “live in a time when the poor are vilified 
by local and national political leaders,” and are “stuck in a cycle of 
powerlessness.”212 Due to the nature of the structural surveillance arrayed 
against them, this population fears the institutions that govern their lives, 
because of their learned helplessness within a system that will only make things 
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worse if they raise questions.213 This state, often accompanied by a Foucauldian 
“internalization of the gaze” of structural surveillance, is the natural 
consequence of a system notionally instantiated to provide a benefit, but 
oriented toward punishment and control.214 
C. Civic Disengagement and Other Chilling Effects 
Fear or mistrust of institutions can often lead to the complete 
disengagement from society by segments of the population. This behavior can be 
viewed as an ongoing struggle between the desire by governments to assess, 
analyze, audit, order, and discipline its citizens, and the resistance by those 
segments of the population who are forced to bear the costs as subjects of these 
structural surveillance programs. One of de Tocqueville’s principal observations 
about the nascent United States was the centrality and importance of civic life, 
attributing this important feature to citizen participation and cooperation as 
“self interest rightly understood.”215 This concept was further observed in post-
World War II America as the population’s “belief that people are generally 
cooperative, trustworthy, and helpful.”216 The ability for people to work with one 
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another and with our institutions requires a base level of trust that can be easily 
damaged under inequality enforced under structural surveillance regimes.217 
Among the chief goals behind the implementation and administration of 
structural surveillance regimes is the maintenance of social order, but this 
power exercise has people on both sides of its equation. Those population 
segments on the losing side can view themselves as shut out of the realms—
physical and otherwise—normally occupied by “respectable classes,” with the 
obvious implications that go along with that reality.218 These experiences can be 
physical, and even violent, as is the case with police interaction, or can be more 
subtly oppressive, as with the case of demeaning questions from social or health 
services case workers, but they all accumulate to erode the sense of trust in our 
institutions and one another.219 The explicit goals of these structural surveillance 
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systems and policies may not be intentionally discriminatory (although they 
sometimes can be), their effect can nonetheless be to alienate certain population 
segments from the mainstream.220 The results can manifest themselves in a 
multitude of ways, from decreased political and civic participation, to chilling 
speech, diminished educational opportunities, and limitations on access to 
quality health care, just to name a few.221 Those most likely to feel these 
deleterious effects are those segments of the population that are most 
vulnerable to stigmatization—minorities (especially African Americans) and the 
poor.222 The means of these effects are often invisible to those not targeted, and 
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even when they are not, these structural surveillance programs become accepted 
as a necessary part of society, and henceforth become ignorable by this 
privileged group. This is, at its core, the reason we cannot allow the effects of 
structural surveillance to be overshadowed by its more technologically 
advanced—and more visible—cousins. 
V. Next Steps: Political Participation and Structural 
Surveillance 
Perhaps one of the most insidious and damaging forms of structural 
surveillance in the history of the United States can be found in the racist 
systems put in place following the abandonment of Reconstruction policies by 
the federal government in 1877.223 Implemented across the southern United 
States through a wide array of “Jim Crow” laws, this system was intended to roll 
back the rights gained by African Americans following the end of the Civil War 
and Reconstruction.224 Structural surveillance under Jim Crow was intended to 
enforce a de facto system of racial segregation and discrimination, which often 
flew in the face of federal law, but was largely ignored by an apathetic (or 
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sympathetic) federal government.225 Central to the aims of Jim Crow was the 
wholesale disenfranchisement of African Americans.226 Through an array of poll 
taxes, literacy tests, character tests, and grandfather clauses, southern states 
erected a maze of structural barriers for black voters and continued to do so 
through 1965, when the Voting Rights Act was passed.227 
Since that time, however, new, more subtle systems of structural 
surveillance are being implemented in various “voter ID” programs.228 Like so 
many systems before it, these new laws are presented both as fair reevaluations 
of voter rights in a post-racial America, and as a necessary system to prevent 
voter fraud.229 Time and again, however, it has been demonstrated that the true 
intent of these programs is to disenfranchise minority populations through 
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structural surveillance systems aimed at communities at risk.230 The next phase 
of this research will focus entirely on these laws and their effects, taking into 
account the nascent, but growing, body of research in this area, as well as 
through new empirical studies and ethnographies. 
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